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Abstract 
This article investigates the impacts of Chinese investment on Thailand’s 
Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) under the Thailand 4.0 policy and the effects 
from the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) under China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) from 2012 to 2019. As a major aspect of Chinese foreign policy, 
LMC, along with the BRI, focuses on building cooperation and economic 
connectivity with Mekong countries. Thailand has become one of China’s 
prime targets for foreign direct investment (FDI). Meanwhile, Thailand benefits 
by linking the EEC with special economic zones in China, supporting the 
concentration of technology and innovation in correspondence with the 
“Thailand 4.0” policy in the current 20-year national development plan. 
Consequently, Thailand is promoting investments by Chinese investors in the 
EEC.  
This research employed qualitative and quantitative methods to study a 
sample of 200 Chinese entrepreneurs in the EEC. The survey found that the 
number of Chinese investors has increased significantly in the EEC since 2014. 
In 2019, Chinese investors had the highest FDI in Thailand. However, the 
majority of these Chinese industries were (and still are) in relatively low-
technology fields. Also, the availability of utility infrastructure for factories in 
the EEC is still comparatively low, and issues around government services and 
the availability of labor and resources must still be addressed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This research examines the 
relationship between the Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation (LMC) under 
the Chinese BRI policy and 
Thailand’s Eastern Economic 
Corridor (EEC) under the Thailand 
4.0 policy, within a sub-regionalism 
framework, in order to further study 
how the interaction between the LMC 
and the EEC has impacted Chinese 
investment in the EEC from 2012 to 
2019. 
The LMC, which is an element of 
China’s BRI, was formed in the first 
LMC Leaders’ Meeting in 2016 
(Lancang-Mekong Cooperation China 
Secretariat, 2017). The LMC greatly 
influenced the new drive for Thai-
Chinese investment cooperation, at a 
time when China aimed to enhance its 
cooperation and connections with 
Thailand. Meanwhile, Thailand made 
links between the EEC and the LMC, 
corresponding to the policy of 
“Thailand 4.0” in its 20-year national 
development plan. At the second 
LMC Leaders’ Meeting in 2018, 
Thailand proposed a connection 
between the LMC and the BRI in 
order to connect with the EEC (Public 
Relations Department, 2018).  
At present, there are a limited 
number of academic works on the 
interaction between the LMC under 
BRI and the EEC, or the impact of 
EEC policies on Chinese business and 
investment, and no critical review is 
yet available. Therefore, it is 
interesting to examine the influence of 
the establishment of the LMC on the 
new drive towards the development 
targets regarding FDI in Thailand. 
The research results will lead to new 
suggestions and new implications for 
academic studies, also promoting 
future Thai and Chinese economic 
cooperation.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review is divided 
into two parts. The first reviews the 
extensive literature on European and 
Asian experiences of sub-regionalism, 
in order to clarify the concept of sub-
regionalism. The second part is a 
review of secondary material and 
relevant literature from academic 
sources, especially journals and 
textbooks, discussing Chinese 
investment under the BRI in 
Thailand’s EEC. 
The reasons for sub-regionalism 
being the conceptual framework of 
this research are first presented. Sub-
regionalism began flourishing in Asia 
after the collapse of the Cold War, as 
a response to the region’s discontent 
with regional integration mechanisms 
(Cihelková and Hnat, 2006: 50). Hook 
and Kearns (1999: 16) pointed out that 
sub-regionalism is often driven by the 
weaker states in the global political 
economy, seeking to strengthen 
cooperation in a closer space than at 
the regional level. As a result, sub-
regionalism might be characterized by 
the interactions between nodes (states 
or parts of states) (Mittelman, 2001: 
214). Additionally, Kearns (1999: 17) 
noted that states in sub-regional 
cooperation attempt to reintegrate 
their economies, employing trade and 
cooperation agreements, towards 
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export promotion within a local 
setting, including cross-border and 
transnational affairs. In these ways, 
sub-regionalism focuses on economic 
development, person-to-person 
contact, and transnational planning 
for infrastructure and transport, as 
well as management of environmental 
problems and natural resources 
(Bremner and Bailes, 1998: 131; 
Hook and Kearns, 1999: 6). Lastly, 
sub-regionalism emphasizes a top-
down foundation of inter-state and 
sub-state cooperation, as well as 
bottom-up processes with grass-root 
organizations or NGOs, private 
businesses, and the local society; in 
doing so, the parties work on cross-
border activities which attract FDI 
(Bremner and Bailes, 1998: 135; 
Cottey, 2009: 15). As a result, 
characteristics of sub-regionalism 
may still be employed to analyse such 
informal cases. 
The existing empirical literature 
on Chinese investment under policies 
of the LMC to support the BRI in the 
sub-regional growth zone, especially 
in Thailand, is limited. Most scholars 
have focused on previous sub-
regional case studies, including 
growth triangles or economic growth 
zones, such as the one between 
Singapore, the Malaysian state of 
Johor, and the Indonesian province of 
Riau (SIJORI), the Greater Tumen 
Initiative (GTI), and the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (Breslin and 
Hook, 2002; Dent, 2008; Dosch, 
2013: 36; Rodan, Hewison, and 
Robinson, 1997; Sum, 2001: 30; Tang 
and Thant: 1998; Thambipillai, 1998). 
It seems that no researchers have yet 
examined LMC under the sub-
regionalism concept, in particular the 
involvement of state, and sub-state 
levels, and the business sector. Some 
researchers have focused only on the 
state level, such as Bhattacharya 
(2015) and Nurruzzaman (2004). 
Moreover, the studies on the 
Mekong Basin highlight the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region, especially 
regarding political, energy, and 
environmental issues. The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) has 
examined the economic and 
infrastructure development of the 
GMS since its establishment in 1992, 
but only from the bank’s and Japanese 
perspectives. Although
Sangkhamanee (2010: 63) found that 
the formation of the GMS was 
accomplished by state and non-state 
actors, he paid attention to the issues 
related to Thailand and the GMS and 
the role of ADB. When LMC was 
formally established in 2016, with the 
Thai and Chinese prime ministers as 
co-chairmen (Zhu, 2010: 5), there 
were insufficient studies on the 
relationship between Thailand and 
China with regard to the LMC and 
Thailand’s special economic policy, 
especially regarding the impact of 
Chinese investment in the EEC. 
Likewise, the relationship 
between the LMC under the Chinese 
BRI, and its relevance to China’s 
connections with Thailand, has not yet 
been adequately researched. Most 
papers emphasize relationships with 
ASEAN, such as “The Significance of 
the Belt and Road Initiative on 
Promoting the Development of Sino-
ASEAN Economic and Trade 
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relations” (Gu, 2018); “The Belt and 
Road Initiative and China-ASEAN 
relations” (Zhao, 2019); and 
“Cooperation Mechanism of 
Lancang-Mekong River and the 
Construction of China-Indochina 
Peninsula Economic Corridor” (Lu, 
2016). It should be noted that none of 
these specifically relate to Thailand, 
or provide an overview on the 
interactions between the LMC and the 
EEC and how this has impacted 
Chinese investment in the EEC; such 
studies are not yet available. 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To investigate the outcome of 
Chinese investments in Thailand’s 
EEC under the Thailand 4.0 policy, as 
well as the effects from the LMC 
under the BRI from 2012-2019, 
information was collected and 
triangulated to affirm its credibility, 
reliability, and validity. Both 
qualitative and quantitative research 
methods were employed, in three 
steps. In order to identify key 
intervening variables, a search for 
empirical data was conducted in the 
three pilot provinces of the EEC, 
namely Chonburi, Rayong, and 
Chachoengsao. 
The first two steps were 
conducted using the qualitative 
method. To define key concepts of 
sub-regionalism, the existing 
literature on sub-regional integration 
processes was investigated, with an 
emphasis on European and Asian 
experiences of sub-regionalism. They 
were then summarized and 
synthesized       as         a     conceptual 
framework. 
Documentary research related to 
Thailand and Chinese policies 
regarding the EEC, BRI, and LMC 
was conducted; this included 
historical materials, archival 
documents, work programmes, and 
speeches, including reviews of 
relevant literature in secondary 
sources from scholarly analyses. 
Statistics and data on Chinese 
investment in the EEC from 2012 to 
2019 was then collected from 
progress reports and relevant policy 
documents from Thailand’s Board of 
Investment, the EEC Secretariat, and 
local governors. 
The second step was to collect 
qualitative information from the 
sample group of policy makers in 
Thailand and China from June to 
August 2019. Information sources 
regarding Thailand included the BOI, 
EEC Secretariat in Bangkok, and the 
local governors in Chonburi, Rayong, 
and Chachoengsao. The three Chinese 
sources in Beijing were the Lancang-
Mekong China Secretariat, the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and 
the China Foreign Affairs University 
(CFAU). In all cases, an in-depth, in-
person interview was carried-out, 
guided by a prepared list of questions 
covering the research objectives. All 
interviews were recorded and 
transcribed, and the transcriptions 
were cross-checked with the 
interviewees. The results of the 
interviews provided insights into 
Thailand’s policies, which included 
industrial and investment histories, as 
well as their strategies for attracting 
foreign investment from China, and 
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valuable information on the Chinese 
BRI and LMC policies was obtained. 
At the conclusion of this stage, the 
survey questions were prepared for 
the final step (Step 3) to quantitatively 
measure the impacts of the EEC on 
Chinese investment. 
Data were gathered first-hand via 
interviews (with closed-ended and 
open-ended questions) and a 
questionnaire survey, during several 
field trips to the three provinces in 
October 2019. Interviews with four 
representatives of Chinese investors 
were organized, as well as an 
interview with the president of a Thai-
Chinese industrial park. Also, 
managers from three enterprises 
randomly selected from each of the 
three provinces, were interviewed, in 
order to clarify the reasons why 
Chinese enterprises invested there and 
how the policies of the LMC and EEC 
affected their companies. Meanwhile, 
questionnaires were sent to Chinese 
entrepreneurs who may be affected by 
the LMC and EEC; these were chosen 
from a random sample of 200 Chinese 
factories out of a total of 274 factories 
in the three provinces. The data 
collected from the 200 surveys were 
converted to percentile data, 
presented in tables, and then analysed 
with descriptive analysis, as shown 
below.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 Impact of LMC Cooperation on 
the EEC 
 
The results of the impact of the 
LMC on Thailand’s economic 
development in the EEC show that 
from 2012 to 2019 Thailand benefited 
directly with significantly increased 
trade and investment from China, 
specifically regarding infrastructure 
developments, modern industrial 
development, and increased economic 
growth in the EEC’s active areas. In 
particular, this effect was evident 
when China’s policy towards 
Thailand under the LMC concentrated 
on a policy of friendly neighbours 
under the sub-regional framework, 
enhancing cooperation in the Mekong 
area in the year 2014, when the LMC 
was proposed (Lu, 2018). The 
Chinese government believed the 
LMC would further China’s trade and 
investment and promote the 
expansion of Chinese corporations’ 
investment in Upper Southeast Asian 
countries, particularly in Thailand. 
With this strategy, Thailand has 
become one of China’s prime 
locations for foreign direct investment 
(The state Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 2019). 
The LMC is an important sub-
regional mechanism that enables the 
BRI to use a relatively small 
geographic area like the Mekong sub-
region to connect member countries 
that are in close proximity along the 
Mekong River, namely China, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, 
and Vietnam, within the frame of the 
China-Indochina Peninsula Economic 
Corridor (CIPEC). CIPEC is a part of 
the New Silk Road Economic Belt, 
which was recognized in 2013 as one 
of the most important corridors 
between the Zhujiang River Delta and 
countries in the Mekong River Basin. 
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CIPEC aims to combine economic 
development and infrastructure 
development to develop economic 
areas throughout the sub-region (Lu, 
2018). This was even more evident 
when the current Premier of the State 
Council of China, Mr. Li Keqiang, 
insisted at the second LMC Leaders’ 
Meeting in 2018, that China’s 
participation in the LMC would 
continue to deepen relations with its 
neighbours, bringing about mutual 
benefits of building friendships and 
partnerships and providing broader 
platforms for regional economic and 
social development (Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation China 
Secretariat, 2018). 
Under the concept of sub-
regionalism, top-down processes at 
the state and sub-state level in the 
global economy, are able to 
strengthen cooperation in economic 
development. This was evident when 
the Chinese Premier of the State 
Council, Mr. Li Keqiang, met with the 
Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-
cha, in Beijing in 2019. He strongly 
affirmed that Thailand and China had 
strengthening cooperation under the 
BRI and LMC, promoting stability 
and development in the region, such 
as by speeding up the Sino-Thai 
railway project and LMC mechanism 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2019). 
Thailand’s Prime Minister responded 
that Thailand supported the BRI as an 
important strategy for stimulating 
economic growth in Asia and 
increasing the number of Chinese 
businesses investing in the EEC, as 
well as making progress on the high-
speed railway project (Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in the 
Kingdom of Thailand, 2019). 
Thailand supports the LMC and BRI 
through its promotion of the EEC, 
under the Thailand 4.0 policy. The 
EEC functions as a sub-regional 
mechanism for enhancing sub-
regional trade and attracting foreign 
direct investment and 
complementarities in production 
systems within a local setting in a 
special economic zone. Consequently, 
Thailand has encouraged Chinese 
investors by implementing policies 
that facilitate access to the country’s 
abundant natural and human resources 
and providing infrastructure 
conducive to the growth of sub-
regional exchanges in the EEC.  
To promote the EEC to investors, 
the Thai government published the 
EEC’s rules, procedures, conditions, 
and processes, in the Government 
Gazette, Eastern Special 
Development Zone Act B.E. 2561 
(2018), on 31 January 2018. The 
investment promotion section of the 
BOI has adjusted its function from 
zoning to granting privileges to 
operators in each zone. It increases the 
emphasis on target industries and 
business, with conditions which 
govern the location of establishments 
in the three provinces of the EEC. For 
example, it grants five to eight years 
of corporate income tax exemption for 
businesses in target technology 
development groups, including 
biotechnology, nanotechnology, 
advanced materials and digital 
products, electronic design, research 
and development, and scientific 
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testing services, among others (BOI of 
Thailand, 2020). Moreover, two 
additional criteria for corporate 
income tax incentives involve human 
resource development, and project 
location, especially regarding projects 
located in the EEC; satisfying these 
two criteria provides eligibility for a 
50 percent corporate income tax 
reduction for an additional two years 
(Kaewsang, interview, February 
2020). 
Sub-regionalism also places 
emphasis on bottom-up processes 
with grass-roots organizations and 
private businesses. For example, 
Thailand arranged for almost 1,000 
participants from both Chinese and 
Thai investors to attend the 
“Thailand-China Business Forum 
2018: Comprehensive Partnership 
through the Belt and Road Initiative 
and the EEC” (Thailand Press 
Release, n.d.). As a result, the Board 
of Investment (BOI) established three 
overseas offices in China (Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou) and 
organized activities to attract further 
Chinese investments (Thailand Press 
Release, n.d.).  
More evidence can be seen in the 
Joint Press Statement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of 
Thailand and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, issued on 
5 November 2019, in Bangkok. Both 
sides expressed satisfaction with their 
cooperation under the MOU on the 
China-Thailand Railway Coopera-
tion, under the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of 
Thailand, 2019). Additionally, based 
on the platform of the China-Thailand 
Rayong Industrial Park, Thailand and 
China would continue to expand 
industrial cooperation regarding 
production capacity and to create 
greater synergies in industrial plans 
and policies, such as next-generation 
automobiles, high-technology 
medical devices, new energy and 
energy-saving vehicles, and rubber 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kingdom of Thailand, 2019). The 
Thai government sees the economic 
transformation of the country as its 
top priority, which is why it seeks to 
ensure a supportive business 
environment and ecosystem for 
investors. 
As a result of good relations 
between the two countries, growth in 
the number of Chinese projects in the 
EEC has been remarkable for several 
years (see Table 1). The BOI 
Secretary General revealed that from 
January 2016 to June 2018, Chinese 
investment projects seeking 
promotional privileges in Thailand 
were valued at 56 billion baht 
(Thailand Press Release, n.d.). BOI 
data for 2019 shows that a total of 429 
projects (393,727 million baht), from 
various countries, had been submitted 
to the BOI for promotional support. 
Most of these were located in the 
eastern region, owing to investment 
promotion measures. The Deputy 
Secretary of the BOI (Kaewsang, 
interview, February 2020) confirmed 
that China had the highest investment 
in 2019, with capital investments 
worth 261,796 million baht spread 
accross 203 projects. The information 
from   the   BOI  (Table 1)   shows    a  
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Table 1: Number of Chinese projects located in the EEC in 2012-2019  
(classified by year) 
Province 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Chachoengsao 2 3 5 7 11 14 19 21 
Chonburi 7 14 24 34 39 49 78 105 
Rayong 13 25 32 59 88 104 124 147 
Source: Board of Investment of Thailand, 2020 
 
significant increase in the number of 
Chinese industries in the EEC area 
from 2012 to 2019, especially from 
2018, when the EEC policy was 
implemented. 
Looking at Table 1, it is obvious 
that Rayong is the province in which 
Chinese investors have invested the 
most; one potential reason is that 
Rayong offers more privileges and 
investment benefits in comparison to 
Chachoengsao or Chonburi 
(Kaewsang, interview, February 
2020). Moreover, the establishment of 
the Thai-Chinese Industrial Park of 
Thailand in Pluak Daeng district, 
Rayong province, has resulted in 
having more Chinese entrepreneurs 
investing there than in other provinces 
(Zhao, interview, 8 March 2020). The 
president of the Thai-Chinese 
Industrial Park, Mr. Zhao Bin, 
confirmed that, in the Thai-Chinese 
industrial estates, there are 147 
factories from different provinces 
across China, with 4,000-5,000 
Chinese employees and 30,000-
40,000 Thai employees. He stated that 
the industries currently receiving the 
highest investments are the 
automobile industry, motorcycle 
industry, and electronics industry. The 
value of investment has increased 
from 2,245.90 million baht in 2014, to 
11,882.20 million in 2015, 20,334.20 
million in 2016, and 24,767.31 
million in 2017 (BOI of Thailand, 
2019).  
 
4.2 Chinese Companies in the EEC 
 
The Thai government has set a 
new target called the “New S-Curve”, 
expected to help the Thai economy to 
achieve a big leap forward under 
Thailand 4.0. The New S-Curve 
consists of five targeted industries: (1) 
robotics, (2) aviation and logistics, (3) 
biofuels and biochemicals, (4) digital 
economy, and (5) medical hub 
(Industrial Estate Authority of 
Thailand, 2019: 4). However, even 
though the EEC, through the BOI’s 
policy, requires high-technology 
industries, mostly in Chonburi 
province, newcomer and current 
Chinese factories are not yet ready for 
high technology for several reasons. 
According to a survey by the BOI 
(2019), the raw materials consumed 
most (listed from the first and 
descending in value) are (1) metal 
powder, (2) oil paint, (3) diamond 
cutting blades, (4) steel bars, (5) steel 
sheets, (6) paper, (7) steel, (8) 
aluminium, (9) tin, and (10) glass. 
This is because most of the Chinese 
factories are involved in light 
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industry. Considering the kind of 
goods produced, there are 45 factories 
making diamond cutting blades 
(accounting for 22.50 percent), 40 
factories producing construction 
equipment and blades (20 percent), 35 
factories producing textile fibres 
(17.50 percent), 30 factories 
producing machinery equipment (15 
percent), 40 factories producing 
blades (20 percent), and 10 factories 
making new composite materials (5 
percent). 
Field research was conducted to 
deliver the interviews and 
questionnaires, ensuring the reliability 
and validity of data regarding the 
impacts of the EEC on Chinese 
investment. Chinese entrepreneurs in 
200 factories were randomly selected 
from  a  total  of  274  factories.   The
sample group consisted of 107 
Chinese factories located  in  Rayong 
province, 78 in Chonburi province, 
and 15 in Chachoengsao (as shown in 
Table 2). 
 
4.3 Views of Chinese Investors 
Regarding the EEC 
 
As another facet of this study, the 
two topics of the positive impacts of 
industrial estate construction on the 
Thai economy (see Table 3), and the 
impact of the Eastern Economic 
Corridor’s policies on entrepreneurs 
in the area (see Table 4), were also 
studied.  
As shown in Table 3, it appears 
that the establishment of the EEC has 
a positive impact on the construction 
of  industrial   estates,  promoting  the  
  
Table 2: Number of Chinese entrepreneurs in the three pilot provinces 
Factory location Number Sample group 
1. Rayong province 147 107 (53.50%) 
2. Chonburi province 106 78 (39.00%) 
3. Chachoengsao province 21 15 (7.50%) 
Total 274 200 (100.00%) 
Source: Board of Investment of Thailand, 2020 
 
Table 3. Level of positive impacts of industrial estate construction on the Thai 
economy, according to the opinion of 200 Chinese entrepreneurs 
Positive impacts of industrial 
estate construction on the Thai 
economy 









0 1 2 3 
1. Improve the technical level 20 (20.00) 35 (35.00) 27 (27.00) 18 (18.00) 
2. Increase production efficiency 10 (10.00) 25 (25.00) 20 (20.00) 45 (45.00) 
3. Market expansion 10 (10.00) 15 (15.00) 18 (18.00) 57 (57.00) 
4. Increase economy size  14 (14.00) 14 (14.00) 10 (10.00) 62 (62.00) 
5. Elevate international trading 15 (15.00) 10 (10.00) 25 (25.00) 50 (50.00) 
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Thai economy in terms of production 
efficiency, expanding markets, in-
creasing the size of the economy, and 
increasing market openings in foreign 
countries. In contrast, only 18 percent 
of entrepreneurs thought that im-
provements in technical level, would 
have  a   high  impact  on   Thailand’s 
economy. Analysis reveals that the 
establishment of the EEC has had a 
positive impact on the construction of 
industrial estates and how these 
estates promote the Thai economy in 
terms of better production efficiency,  
expanding the market, creating a 
larger     economy,     and     elevating 
international trade. However, in terms 
of improving the technical level of 
industry, it has had a low impact. In 
addition, the survey found that of the 
finished products manufactured by 
Chinese operators, 20 percent were 
sold in Thailand, while 80 percent 
were sold in foreign countries, with 
the majority exported to the United 
States, Japan, Europe, and Australia. 
It was also considered necessary 
to learn what impacts the policies, 
location, and other characteristics of 
the EEC, had on the Chinese 
companies themselves; the related 
data is presented in Table 4.  
The EEC policies have had a 
relatively high to significant impact 
on many issues. Firstly, the 
availability of management teams and 
personnel in various departments was 
found to have a high level of impact; 
around 65% of business owners 
thought this characteristic of the EEC 
had a relatively high or significant 
impact on their operations. 
Particularly, the ability to recruit 
unskilled laborers easily and 
conveniently was found to have a 
relatively high impact on the Chinese 
business, with 45 percent of 
entrepreneurs choosing “high 
impact”, even though the survey 
showed that 20 percent of 
entrepreneurs felt that the ability to 
recruit skilled and semi-skilled 
workers in the area had a low impact. 
Chinese entrepreneurs in the EEC 
require a large number of skilled, and 
semi-skilled workers. The 
questionnaire results also show that 
47.13 percent of workers are skilled, 
34.39 percent semi-skilled, and 15.92 
unskilled, while the remaining 2.55 
percent fall into “others”. Therefore, 
difficulty in recruiting skilled workers 
locally is a major problem for Chinese 
entrepreneurs, who must recruit 
skilled workers from China, and thus 
also encounter problems securing 
work permits in Thailand. 
The survey revealed that most 
entrepreneurs (48%) considered the 
availability of areas such as industrial 
estates, industrial parks, and similar 
locations, capable of supporting their 
establishments, to have a high impact. 
In terms of the safety and public order 
of the area, the level of impact was 
found to be relatively high, with 42 
percent of entrepreneurs identifying 
its “high impact”; naturally, investors 
who feel safe will want to invest. 
Regarding the impact of the EEC on 
Chinese entrepreneurs’ ability to 
purchase or rent a suitable size of land 
for their establishment at a reasonable 
price, the survey indicated a high 
impact for 28 percent of entrepre-
neurs, while 52 percent  considered it 
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Table 4: Impact of Eastern Economic Corridor policies on entrepreneurs in the 
area, according to 200 Chinese business owners  
Factors affecting 
entrepreneurs in the EEC 
Impact level 
High Significant Moderate Minor Negligible 
4 3 2 1 0 
1. Able to obtain factors of 
production from new or nearby 










2. The readiness of the 
management team and 











3. Ability to recruit skilled or 
semi-skilled workers in the area 










4. Ability to recruit unskilled 










5. Able to purchase land for 
projects at a suitable size and at 









6. Efficient one-stop 
government service centre to 










7. Have areas supporting the 
establishment, such as industrial 










8. Available basic utilities, i.e. 
electricity, water, information 










9. Available logistics systems in 






















11. Special government 
promotion and support 



















to be a significant impact. Moreover, 
the availability of logistics systems in 
the service areas – i.e., regional freight 
stations, distribution centres with 
information systems to aid warehouse 
management, and import-export 
services for raw materials and 
finished goods – has a considerably 
significant level of impact, reported 
by 44 percent of entrepreneurs. On the 
matter of receiving investment 
support and general benefits from the 
government sector, the level of impact 
was significant for 45 percent of the 
companies.  
On   the  other   hand,   the   EEC 
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policies have a relatively low impact 
on entrepreneurs in many respects. 
For instance, promoting investment or 
receiving government incentives was 
found to have a relatively low level of 
significance. Most of the Chinese 
entrepreneurs would like to have more 
privileges or benefits. Regarding the 
issue of procurement of factors of 
production from new project sites or 
nearby areas, the companies indicated 
that they had relatively low access to 
such areas, creating the need to import 
raw materials from China, which then 
resulted in higher production costs. 
The availability of utility 
infrastructure in the area (electricity, 
water supply, internet, 
telecommunications, and wastewater 
management) is still relatively low 
and should be improved to a higher 
standard. However, the EEC 
demonstrated a moderate level for 
some impacts, for instance, 45 percent 
of entrepreneurs felt that the 
availability of one-stop service 
centres in the areas had a moderate 
level of impact. 
In addition, the interviews and 
questionnaires revealed a great deal of 
information regarding the problems 
for stakeholders and some of the 
obstacles to development in the EEC. 
The first significant problem is a 
lack of work permits for Chinese 
workers in the short term in some 
manufacturing units. This is an urgent 
issue which must be promptly 
resolved. The Thai government 
should alleviate some conditions or 
make adjustments to the current 
procedures. The second problem is 
providing sufficient highly skilled 
local Thai workers. As Chinese 
companies require highly skilled 
workers, the Thai government should 
develop a long-term strategy for 
sustainably producing a highly skilled 
local workforce. Third, the ability to 
supply production facilities in the new 
industrial estate or the nearby area is 
insufficient. The Thai government 
and local governors should amplify 
easy access to local resources and take 
actions to reduce the cost of procuring 
raw materials. Additionally, the lack 
of basic utility infrastructure is a key 
problem of the industrial estates. The 
local governors and local utility 
companies should improve utility 
services for public plans in the EEC 
for any kind of investment. Lastly, 
most Chinese companies agreed that 
the government should offer 
investment promotion benefits and 
privileges, especially in the EEC, in 
order to attract more FDI from China. 
The government and local governors 
should consider an appropriate level 
of facilitation of consistent Thai laws 
appropriate to the current and future 
situations, especially regarding issues 
involving the environment and land 
purchases, in order to prevent any 
negative effects on local people in the 
area.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
LMC is a new cooperative 
mechanism, supporting the BRI by 
connecting the Mekong sub-region 
with the CIPEC. Chinese foreign 
policy under the LMC and BRI 
focuses on building cooperation and 
expanding trade and investment in 
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member countries. Thailand has 
become one of China’s prime targets 
for foreign direct investment. In the 
meantime, Thailand has supported the 
LMC and BRI by promoting its EEC 
under the Thailand 4.0 policy, in order 
to directly benefit by stimulating trade 
and investment from China. 
With the aim of exploring the 
impact of the LMC on Chinese 
investment in the EEC, this research 
found that the LMC has had a 
considerable and significant effect on 
Chinese investment in the EEC. As 
was revealed in the survey, during the 
five years after the LMC’s 
establishment in 2014, the number of 
Chinese investment projects in the 
EEC significantly increased, year 
upon year, especially in Rayong, the 
province where Chinese investors 
have invested the most. The 
researchers discovered several 
challenges to the government’s EEC 
policy, so it is recommended that the 
government should provide greater 
facilitation for Chinese entrepreneurs 
and investors in the EEC, especially 
regarding labor skills development, as 
well as providing more services, 
infrastructure, and utilities, to 
facilitate the operations of factories 
and other companies based in the 
EEC. 
 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Based on the findings from the 
interviews and survey, useful 
recommendations to further promote 
Chinese investment are proposed 
below for Thailand’s policymakers to 
take into consideration.  
First and foremost, since 
Thailand initiated the EEC, the local 
land has become more expensive. As 
a result, the cost of production is 
higher. A new policy issued by the 
BOI with regard to land purchases has 
been adjusted according to the EEC 
policy for foreign investors. 
Previously, foreign investors could 
purchase land in the size of 1-20 rai 
(1,600-32,000 square meters). Under 
the new regulations, in 2016 foreign 
companies are not eligible to buy plots 
larger than one rai; they may lease 
property, but rental fees are high. The 
survey found that safety and public 
order have a relatively large impact on 
the decision to locate in industrial 
estates, so Chinese investors want to 
invest in the EEC, but they also want 
the ability to purchase land of a 
suitable size at a reasonable price.  
Another weak point is that 
logistics systems in the service areas 
for import-export services of raw 
materials and finished goods still 
require improvement. Moreover, the 
Thai government should also develop 
one-stop service centres where 
Chinese investors are able to 
conveniently access services from 
government agencies in China and 
Thailand for technical assistance and 
advisory purposes; doing so will save 
time and money for both the 
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